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Reconnecting theory and practice in a pluralistic organizing context: Issues and Aristotelian 
considerations 
ABSTRACT 
 
The overall purpose of this paper is to contribute to the theory - practice gap debate in 
organization studies, especially in pluralistic contexts such as project organizing. We briefly 
outline some of the current debates, i.e. modernist and postmodernist proposals, and the 
prevalent dichotomous thinking stance assumptions to better move beyond it, anchoring our 
contribution in the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy. We introduce the current state 
of the debate, part of the broad question of “science that matters”, and the various discourses 
between practice and academia within social sciences and more specifically organizational 
studies. We briefly critically summarize some main features of the two main philosophical 
stances (modernism, postmodernism), before presenting some key aspects, for the purpose of 
this paper, of the Aristotelian pre-modern practical and ethical philosophy. Then, we build on the 
foundations above established, discussing propositions to reconnect theory and practice 
according the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy, and some key implications for 
research notably in the following areas: roles played by practitioners and scholars, emancipatory 
praxeological style of reasoning, for closing the “phronetic gap” and reconnecting means and 
ends, facts and values, relation between collective praxis, development of “good 
practice” (standards), ethics and politics. We conclude highlighting the role of the suggested shift 
to an Aristotelian emancipatory style of reasoning for reconciling theory and practice. 
Keywords: Aristotle, theory, practice 
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Introduction 
 
The overall purpose of this paper is to contribute to the theory - practice gap debate in 
organization studies, especially in pluralistic contexts such as project organizing and 
temporary–based organizations. However, rather than taking a classical stance rooted in 
Philosophy of Science (e.g. Modern vs. Postmodern lens), we focus on what practitioners do 
in organizing rather than what organizing (theories and) practices are. We briefly outline 
some of the current discussions ranging from what we can name modernist and postmodernist 
proposals (Miller, 2009) and the prevalent dichotomous thinking stance assumptions to better 
move beyond it, anchoring our contribution in the Aristotelian ethical and practical 
philosophy (Duska, 1993; Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011). We introduce the current state of the 
debate, part of the broad question of “science that matters”, and the various discourses 
between practice and academia within social sciences and more specifically organizational 
studies (OS). We briefly critically summarize some main features of the two main 
philosophical stances (modernism, postmodernism) in OS, before presenting some key 
aspects, for the purpose of this paper, of the Aristotelian pre-modern practical and ethical 
philosophy. We discuss and conclude with some major implications of the suggested shift to 
an Aristotelian emancipatory style of reasoning for reconciling theory and practice. 
 
Initial considerations: the state of affairs 
 
From a broad stance, the problem of science that matters has been widely discussed in 
literature (e.g.. Kraaijenbrink, 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Schram, 2004). In project 
management, a stream in critical studies with Foucauldian perspective (Hodgson, 2002; 
Cicmil &Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007) through the ‘Making Projects Critical’ 
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workshops, and a phronetic approach stream with focus on megaprojects (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012) have been developed. These studies consider a clear dichotomy 
between ‘bottom-up’ (social science) and ‘top-down’ (natural science) approaches (Schram, 
2004, p. 420) which in turn leads to critically evaluate the relation between theory and 
practice (Blomquist et al, 2010; p.10) and how to bridge the gap between these two. The 
central argument of his paper is that managers are rarely reduced to the theory-applying 
decision makers, and that managers only matter when there is uncertainty, uncertainty being 
the defining characteristic of management practice. Therefore uncertainty should have a more 
explicit place in management theory and practice in order to address the gap (Kraaijenbrink, 
2010, p. 2, p. 15). Aram & Salipante (2003) attempt to reconcile the debate between theory 
and practice by proposing management scholars must adopt process of inquiry that is 
characterized by high rigour and relevance.  Such inquiry involves collaboration between 
actors from diverse disciplines to conduct problem-focused research in a specific context and 
which crosses epistemological lines.  
 
Different “discourses” for the relation theory – practice: from modern practice to 
postmodern “practice turn” 
 
Kieser & Nicolai (2005) make strongly the point that the trade-off between rigor and 
relevance is not solved through success factor research (p. 275).  They suggest that science 
should be conceptualized as a self-referential social system . This is achieved by (i). 
producing (sometimes implicitly) knowledge for problem-solving, and (ii). Developing 
alternatives to existing practices using science. Such efforts lead to academic research that is 
relevant to practice (Kieser, & Nicoloi, 2005). Lalonde et al. (2012) demonstrate that, in 
project situations, two forms of inquiries  (type 1 / knowledge-based – theory – abstract / 
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formal, and type 2 action-based – practical - particular) are intermeshed and that there is a 
subtle to-and-from movement between the 'real' (facts, truths and presumptions) and the 
'preferable' (values, hierarchies and loci) (Lalonde et al., 2012, p. 421, 425, 428). 
Authors recognise the tensions resulting from the shock between the tyranny of the particular 
and practical knowledge and the decontextualized ideal of formal-cum-abstract knowledge 
(Toulmin, 1990, p. 30-35). This is brought forward by the modern and postmodern 
perspectives. Modern is concerned by theories supporting decision-making in response to a 
probabilistic context (and thus enabling some kind of certainty); postmodern recognizes 
managerial actions and practices as a response to complex and socially constructed particular 
contexts (Chia, 1995; Miller, 2009).  “Although the modem and the postmodern are clearly 
inextricably intertwined” (Chia, 1995, p. 580), they proceed from a different ontological lens, 
i.e. being and stability vs. becoming and change as a normal state-of-affairs (Tsoukas & Chia, 
2002). This debate led to the concept of “late modernity” (Giddens, 1990) although 
Appignanesi et al. (1995, p. 126, p. 172) posit post modernity as a hyper-technological 
version of modernity. 
 
Modern “practice” 
 
According to the modern lens, practice, usually preceded by a qualifying adjective such as 
“good” or “best” reified as standards, is assumed to be informed by a tradition of general 
theories, such as covering laws or statistics generalizations, supporting rational decision-
making. In short, the modern perspective is about what practice “are”. This view is subject 
to number of criticisms as this more often falls into the realm of Standardization (Brunsson et 
al., 2000). The debate between the “pros” and “cons” of standards / standardization not 
withstanding (e.g. Brunsson et al., 2000, pp. 169—172), the mechanistic and rationalistic 
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theories have proposed that more the extent of standardization, higher the organization’s 
performance (March & Sutton, 1997). This is to say that we need to move from “best” and 
“good” practices suitable for a simple or complicated environment to more emergent and 
novel practices relevant for or complex or chaotic world (e.g. Jackson, 2003). Hodgson & 
Cicmil (2007) demonstrate how the reification of these organizational objects leads to their 
naturalization, excluding alternative representations or classifications, and provide to this a 
rationalistic basis for "epistemic communities" (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 435) and control 
(and the so-called "professionalization") of the "discipline" (Hodgson, 2002).   
 
Postmodern “practice-turn” 
 
In order to come back to the empirical dynamic of facts, various authors in project 
management suggest a shift to a post-modern stance considering what people do in project 
context and situations (e.g. see critical studies (Hodgson, 2002; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006; 
Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007), practice-turn (Blomquist et al., 2010; Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012), 
phronetic approach (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012), new institutional theories 
and conventions theory (Bredillet, 2003). One commonalty amongst these approaches is the 
focus on the “practice” (what practitioners “do” instead of what practice “are”) and the 
recognition of the role of power, actors' positions, values and agendas in the construction and 
use of knowledge. 
A vast amount of literature (Foucault, 1977; Giddens, 1979) has been published since the 
early 1980s dealing with practice in social theory (Reckwitz, 2002). These works aim at 
overcoming the dualism between 'individualism' and 'societism' (Schatzki, 2005). “Practice 
theorist aim to respect both the efforts of individual actors and the workings of the social” 
(Whittington, 2006, p. 614). The three core themes for practice theory (practices – various 
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tools, norms and procedures, praxis – activity involved in the decision-making and acting, and 
practitioners – actors involved in, or seeking to influence the decision-making and acting) are 
forming interrelated parts of a whole (Giddens, 1984). In the project management context, the 
practice turn, strongly inspired by the strategy as practice stream, has gained momentum (e.g. 
Blomquist et al., 2010; Bredillet, 2004; Cicmil, 2006; Cicmil et al., 2006; Hällgren & 
Söderholm, 2011; Lalonde et al, 2012)). Vaara & Whittington (2012) make clear that the 
practice turn “defines itself in opposition to methodological individualism”, how “praxis 
relies on practices”, and “how social structures and human agency link together in the 
explanation of action” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 288).  Brown (2012, p. 446—447) 
explores similarities and differences between practice (i.e. Varaa & Whittington, 2012) and 
phronetic turns (i.e. Flyvbjerg, 2004), and suggests no possible reconciliation between them 
(Brown, 2012, p.441). However, the limitation in Brown’s argument is that the phronetic turn 
is barely Aristotelian as the “expert” or “phronetic researcher” remains an outsider to the 
“practice” and this is in contradiction with Aristotelian thought (for a full critique of phronetic 
social science, and aspects linked to misconception of epistêmê, value –rationality, see 
Eikeland, 2008, pp. 43—44 and note 28).  Therefore the practice lens offers a contrasted 
classification of perspectives with regards to practice and knowledge / theory development 
and their mutual relation:  
-­‐ the “practice turn” can be seen as still rooted in a kind of “social scientific” spirit – 
attempting to balance rigor and relevance – with a general focus on “knowledge and 
inquiry ‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238),  
-­‐ while the phronetic proposal suggests moving from a “turn” to a “revolution”, a 
“practice revolution” with an impact on society – focusing on relevance, and that “our 
knowing is ‘in’ our action” (Schön, 1983, p. 49). Maturana & Varela (1998, p. 27—
29) similarly define knowing as “effective action”, and write that “all doing is 
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knowing, and all knowing is doing.” In Practice theory words, Giddens (1984, p. 4) 
explicates knowledgeability as “inherent within the ability to ‘go on’ within the 
routines of social life”.  
We argue that, in a pluralistic organizational context, i.e. “… characterized by multiple 
objectives, diffuse power and knowledge-based work processes” (Denis et al., 2007, p. 179), 
e.g. temporary-based organizations / project organizing (Packendorff, 1995), the “practice” 
world is not enough to fully capture the mutual relationships between practice (ways of 
knowing) and theory for the following reasons. First, it doesn’t address well uncertain and 
complex organizing phenomena. The non-routine action and decision process involving 
explicit knowledge is not the primary focus of practice turn advocating “habitus” and routines 
anchored in the tacit and implicit, dimension of knowledge (Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013; 
Polanyi, 1966). Furthermore the conscious organizing efforts (i.e. not spontaneous self-
organizing) in a pluralistic context principle is in contradiction with the practice turn concept 
of unconscious behaviour and ideas such as pure spontaneous emergence of organizing 
phenomena. Second, it is anchored in a dichotomous thinking about scholars vs. practitioners 
(the knowers and the known). The relation individual - social and knowers – known should be 
considered in a recursive and reflexive lens (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1198), and the 
concept of self-reference (Hernes & Bakken, 2003, p. 1513) we can contend that “the 
individual independence is embodied in collective dependence” (Gomez, 2006, p. 222) 
leading us to cool down the proposition of the primacy of the social on methodological 
individualism (practice-turn lens) and conversely, considering Flybjerg’ phronetic lens). 
Third, it doesn’t fully clarify the problem of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” 
with regards to practical experience. The relation between means and ends is not made 
explicit and to this regards – see below – the confusing relation between deontology (duty, 
means) and consequentialism (ends) ethics of practice. Collective deliberation and dialogue 
9 
about these relations, including facts and values, that is the recognition of some degree of 
rationalization of everyday practice and experience require the support of analytic and 
epistemic effort (“epistemic impulses)” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 23, p. 46). With regards to practice 
and theory, the empirical observation suggested by both the practice and phronetic proposals, 
while claiming rejecting any dualism (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1241—1243), do not 
pay full tribute to the necessary acquired practical experience as way of knowing involving 
being native of situations and actions (Eikeland, 2008, p. 35) and not just an “empirical 
observer” or “engaged scholar” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). As Eikeland (2008) poses, 
“knowledge and competence is increasingly developed from within practical contexts...” (p. 
21). Based on accurate reading of Aristotle, Lalonde et al. (2012) aptly address this point: 
“This work [An empirical investigation of the project situation: PM practice as an inquiry 
process] should be considered, among others (e.g., Bourgault et al., 2006), as a vehicle for 
experiential or in-action teaching styles.” (p. 429, [text added by us]).  
These few developments illustrate an important phenomenon: the dissatisfaction in face of 
problems, antinomies, perplexities and contradictions. "We feel we have overcome our 
ancestors, when in fact we are reworking the very sources of their dissatisfaction in new 
ways." (Hacking, 2002, p. 2). Aristotle says that right method in philosophy begin by noticing 
contradictions in popular belief, or conflict between general opinion and the beliefs of the 
wise.  
We face therefore this paradoxical situation of having  
-­‐ on the one hand classifications of phenomena governed by a tradition of "natural 
sciences", rationality, universality, objective reality and value-free decision making 
(e.g. Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p.11) exemplified by the development of 'Standards' 
and 'Bodies of Knowledge' and; 
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-­‐ on the other hand "the organizational reality, which is often messy, ambiguous, 
fragmented and political in character" (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 60) leading to the 
quest of Verstehen.  
 
Verstehen 
 
By contrast, to the pseudo-quantitative or mathematical methods, which distort and 
oversimplify, human action is accomplished by the use of Verstehen “the intuitive quickness 
of enlightened understanding”. (Schütz, 1964, p. 4). This can be related to the notion of 
relevance by feasibility (Le Moigne, 2007, p. 117), and Ingenium “an ‘intelligent’ action, 
‘ingenium,’ the mental faculty which makes possible to connect in a fast, suitable and happy 
way the separate things” as stated by Le Moigne (2007, p. 118), quoting Vico (1708).  
Additionally, the Aristotelian teleological understanding of the world (see below, the quest for 
“eudaimonia” (well-being), not to be confused with the utilitarian consequentialist “ends”) 
implies to consider individuals and objects according to the purposes they have and the role 
they have to play. (Maclntyre, 1985, p. 57—59; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 669—670). 
Lalonde at al. (2012) explain that the creativity in the management of projects stem from the 
unstable balance between the real and the preferable, between the physical world and the 
world of intentionality and preference; in other words, implying persons defined by and 
interacting with historical, social, and cultural contexts. (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 57—59), and 
judging such contextual uncertainty is a goal oriented and reflective intuitive process 
(Perminova et al, 2008, p.77).   
This shift of perspective involves moving from evaluative judgments in abstracto based on 
list of attributes (what practice “are”), to factual statements in concreto based on what is 
done in a particular situation and context (what practitioners “do”) (Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 
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2013; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997). Consequently, far from seeing the uncertainty inherent to 
action being a tyranny of the particular, of the local, and of the timely to be escaped (Toulmin 
1990, p. 30–35), we rather see a place for emancipation (Habermas, 1973; Gadamer, 1975) 
and freedom enabling to deliberate in a “prudent” manner (phrónêsis) and to act to create ‘a’ 
desirable future. Thus "in the social domain in general, and in organizations in particular, 
uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together". (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 671). 
In project situations, Lalonde et al. (2012) recognize that "the relationships established 
between the actors' cognitive schemas and perceptions of the situation, is an uncertain state 
of affairs. The actors do not deal with clear-cut situations. Indeed, projects by their very 
nature tend to expand." (Lalonde et al., 2012, p. 425).   
However, the shift of perspective, from “modern” standard to Verstehen, is not per se 
sufficient to fully grasp what practitioners “do”, as it leaves us with the fundamental 
modern and post-modern dichotomous thinking between “science” and “practical matters”. At 
the heart of this is the question of classifications since there is a dynamical interaction 
between the classifications developed (in social and human sciences), and the individuals or 
behaviours classified (Hacking, 2002).  
 
Beyond modern and postmodern philosophies, Aristotle 
 
This then leads us to consider a move from a scientific rationality to a practical rationality 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 2010). Moving beyond this dichotomous thinking 
involves shifting our focus from philosophy of science to a practical and ethical philosophy 
(Duska, 1993): practical because the focus should be on the relevance of practice if we want 
to make research that matters and ethical, beyond utilitarian and consequentialist ethics 
focusing on material ends (“good” or “best” possible outcome of actions) and deontological 
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ethics focusing on the means (duty, “right actions”) and on what one “ought to do”, because 
what matters is the achievement of eudaimonia, individual “good life” in a good society. The 
Aristotelian practical and ethical philosophy offers a perfect ground for this purpose. 
Furthermore, as we develop below, the Aristotelian philosophy is fundamentally relational, in 
line with Hacking’s above-mentioned statement about the dynamic interaction between the 
classifications and the classified: the knower and the known always relate to each in a specific 
way.  
In the next section, we introduce some key aspects of the Aristotelian tradition, putting it in 
perspectives with the formers.  
 
Pre-modernism: an Aristotelian perspective 
 
Theory, practices, praxis and practitioners: contemporary thinkers limitations 
 
If we summarize the current state of the debate, on the one hand we face the “Enlightenment” 
assumptions underlying modern positivist Social science, grounded in “unity-of-science 
dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” and 
cause-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern 
interpretivist proposal, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 
2012, p. 20).  
For contemporary thinkers, while there is little agreement about a definition of what a theory 
is (Corley & Gioia, 2011, p. 12), a general definition, for instance, can be offered: Theory is 
“an ordered set of assertions about a generic behaviour or structure assumed to hold 
throughout a significantly broad range of specific instances” (Boxenbaum & Rouleau, 2011, 
p. 274).  
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Vaara & Whittington, in their in-depth review of strategy-as-practice researches, describe 
-­‐ “Practices refer to the various tools, norms, and procedures of strategy work, from 
analytical frameworks such as Porter’s Five Forces to strategic planning routines 
such as strategy workshops. 
-­‐ Praxis refers to the activity involved in strategy-making, for example, in strategic 
planning processes or meetings. 
-­‐ Practitioners are all those involved in, or seeking to influence, strategy-making.” 
(Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 290) 
Contemporary thinkers have commented the concept of “praxis” and raised the risk of losing 
an intimate understanding leading to some dilution of its basic meaning into “activity”. “All 
praxis is an activity, but not all activity is praxis” warns Vazquez (Vazquez, 1977, p. 149), 
and as Warry (1992, p.155) observes the analytic impoverishment leads to praxis and practice 
being used synonymously.. We must return to the roots of the concept and explicit it. Vazquez 
(1977) offers a clear and simple definition of the term when he wrote “Praxis […] is the 
central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but is 
also a guide to its transformation…” (Vazquez, 1977, p. 149). Praxis is a particular form of 
activity, a reflexive activity underlying a rational action. It is concerned with change, is 
present and future oriented, requires anticipation of the effect of action, rather than the 
interpretation of past or prior event (Vazquez, 1977, p. 169; Warry, 1992, p. 156).  
However, these definitions do not pay a full tribute to the richness of meanings and nuances 
embedded in the Aristotelian gnoseology. Eikeland (2007, 2008, 2012) and Eikeland & 
Nicolini (2011) aptly discuss Aristotle gnoseology – for Eikeland (2007, p. 347) gnoseology, 
by contrast to epistemology, involves broader notion of knowledge. Epistêmê is just one form 
of gnôsis. (Eikeland, 2007). These authors emphasize that the limitations of the modern and 
post-modern appropriation of Aristotle philosophy, e.g.:  
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“Scientific methods are usually specialised techniques quite different from and extraneous 
to the ways of producing knowledge prevalent in our everyday lives. This goes even for 
the “post-modernist”, relativist, and constructivist alternatives gradually becoming 
mainstream, which often seem to move to the opposite extreme of making all forms of 
knowledge epistemologically equivalent. But these modernist, or post-modernist, ways of 
thinking are insufficient for understanding both knowledge and ethics.” (Eikeland, 2007, 
p. 348) 
They highlight especially the lack of understanding of nuances between the various concepts 
(virtues, ways of knowing and knowledge forms) and the willingness to categorize these 
concepts as being independent and therefore miss a fundamental point: for Aristotle, and for 
the move beyond dichotomous thinking, here theory vs. practice, “Theôría was not just 
speculation and calculation from a separate and insulated observatory”. While meaning 
“something like studying for the purpose of understanding and truth, without intervening, and 
without the study being subordinated to or serving to promote any immediate plans for 
specific actions of any kind, […] acquired, practical, participant experience (Empeiría) was 
necessary” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 46—47).  
 
Relational way of thinking 
 
Drawing mostly on Eikeland (2007; 2008; 2012) we summarize some key aspects of Aristotle 
gnoseology. Aristotle’s thinking about ethical and intellectual virtues is fundamentally and 
explicitly relational. The knower and the forms of knowledge always relate to each other in a 
specific way of knowing, enabling to reconnect means and ends, facts and values. The ethico-
political consequences of the different ways of knowing are also explicitly considered.  
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Ethical virtues 
 
For Aristotle, ethics and prudence (phronêsis) is intimately linked to the ultimate “end” of 
humankind, that is improving our lives and achieving good life, happiness and well-being 
(eudaimonia) both for individuals and for the society. Ethics is the condition for making 
righteous actions possible which in turn enable the development of right habits and, in turn, 
enable the development of good character (aretê) (disposition (hexis) involving conscious 
choice) leading to achieve happiness. Ethics is thus practical knowledge rooted on experience 
and “good action” oriented rather than just theoretical knowledge. Practical wisdom 
(phronêsis), being both an ethical virtue AND an intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 2008, p. 53), 
must be acquire through practice and is not just about applying general understanding to 
particular occasions . Aristotle mentions good leaders showing phronêsis (Aristotle, 1926, 
1144b). Two aspects should be emphasized: 1) every ethical virtue is a balanced condition to 
both excess and deficiency (Aristotle, 1926, 1106a26—b28); and 2) ethical theory does not 
offer a decision procedure as ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules although some 
rules are uninfringeable. Ethical theory illuminates the nature of virtue but what a virtuous 
agent must do in particular occasion depends on the circumstances.  
 
Intellectual virtues 
 
However, Aristotle makes clear that, in order to fully acquire practical wisdom, prudence 
(phronêsis) one must become both ethically virtuous and practically wise through 1) the 
development of proper habits (ethical virtues, not part of the reasoning soul but following 
reason) and 2) when aptitude to reasoning (intellectual virtues) is fully developed. This 
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development is not sequential, and Aristotle states that ethical virtue is fully developed only 
when integrated with phronêsis (Aristotle, 1926, 1144b14—17).  
Two forms of praxis and theory (epistêmê) are related. Praxis knowledge denotes “a 
relationship between colleagues sharing common standards for how to go about their 
professional activities“ (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351; Eikeland, 2012, p. 26). Theory signifies 
“…epistêmê, that is, for knowledge that was stabilised and pretty secure, about subjects that 
were for the most part or always stable and regular themselves” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 350).  
Praxis1, dialogue & dialectics, is “the way of learning or research, moving “up” from how 
things appear to us phenomenologically to an articulated insight in basic principles … 
searching patterns, similarities and differences in our accumulated practical experience…” 
(Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland, 2012, p. 27). However, “critical dialogue needs relief from 
immediate pressure to act” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 29), and “a permanent skholê (leisure - open, 
free space - school) embedded in practical settings is needed, making it possible to develop, 
unfold, and articulate the "grammars" of different social settings” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 18).   
The related form of theory, called epistêmê1 or theôría, “where like in grammar there is no 
physical distance between the knower and the known. “This means that the subjects studied – 
our own forms of practice – must be “reified” reflectively in order to be grasped, since they 
are not really outside us or outside our practices at all” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351; Eikeland, 
2012, p. 24). Furthermore, “…theory as “Theôría” thus becomes a resource to be used in 
action and for action to produce emancipatory visibilisation and expansive articulation“ 
(Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011, p. 169).  
The second form of theory, called theôrêsis or epistêmê2 is “based on observation at a 
distance. Theôrêsis relates to external objects without intervening. The relation implied 
between the knower and the known, is difference, distance, separation, non-interaction, and 
non-interference (ex. astronomy)” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 349; Eikeland, 2012, p. 21).  
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Phronêsis is a knowledge form related to Praxis2. Phrónêsis is ”the way down from “theory” 
to “practice” … the practical enactment is often immediate and spontaneous … but in other 
fields where the practice is not equally standardised and “automated”, for example in ethics, 
the “application” of general competence or of the knowledge of principles provided by 
ethical virtues like justice, courage, friendliness, honesty, etc., needs deliberation or 
phrónêsis, trying to find out how to act in the most just or fair way towards someone right 
here and now. The point is that the way from theory to practice within this kind of knowledge 
is not deductive, nor does it go by some form of technical calculation of effects. And it was 
never intended to be deductive or calculative by Aristotle” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland, 
2012, p. 31; text emphasized by us).   
 
The mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis: inseparability between ethical and 
intellectual virtues 
 
For Aristotle, praxis, phrónêsis and ethics are inseparable. The aspects of values, ethics are 
fully embedded in the teleological perspective. As Aristotle (1926, 1140b 6) put it: "while 
making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end". Tsoukas 
& Cummings explain: "there is an internal relationship between acting and the standards in 
terms of which acting is judged, which is not there when producing artifacts." (Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 666). For Aristotle, the central role is played by phrónêsis because, in 
human actions, the ethical virtues and practical knowledge go together: "it is impossible to be 
practically wise without being good" (1926, 1144a 18). Phrónêsis involves "knowing the right 
values and being able to put them into practice in concrete situations". (Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 666). As phrónêsis is both intellectual excellence and excellence of 
character, we cannot be intellectuality prudent (phronimoi) without being ethically good 
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(Eikeland, 2008, p. 59). Phrónêsis, as intellectual virtue, cannot be acquired alone 
independently from other ethical virtues. Thus it is impossible to separate phrónêsis from 
other ethical virtues: “we cannot be prudent without being good and we cannot be fully good 
without being prudent, taking the particulars of the situation into account” (Eikeland, 2008, 
p. 64).  
The focus of the particulars of the situation leads Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 666) to ask 
the question “Apart from being inherently value-laden, what is it about practical matters that 
requires human agents to have practical wisdom instead of merely scientific or craft 
knowledge?” Referring to Aristotle, Nussbaum (1990, pp. 70-75) indicates three reasons: 1) 
practical matters change over time, and new problems call for new responses, 2) practical 
matters are inherently ambiguous, 3) Nussbaum (1990, p. 74) observes that “Aristotle 
suggests that the concrete ethical case may simply contain some ultimately particular and 
non-repeatable elements”.  
We can now build on the foundations above established and re-join theory and practice, 
highlighting important propositions.  
 
Implications and concluding comments 
 
Reconnecting theory and practice according the Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy, 
above discussed, has some key implications for research notably in the following areas: roles 
played by practitioners and scholars, emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, for 
closing the “phronetic gap” and reconnecting means and ends, facts and values, relation 
between collective praxis, development of “good practice” (standards), ethics and politics. 
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Reuniting the scholar – practitioner dichotomous roles: the Aristotelian phronimos and 
the “praXitioner” 
 
The assumptions about the roles, behaviours and expectations of the agents or actors, as 
framed by the classical classes' dichotomy between scholars and practitioners (Aram & 
Salipante, 2003, p. 1900; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 806), involved in knowledge 
creation and transfer is at the centre of the theory vs. practice and relevance vs. rigour debate. 
Some authors have pleaded for some kind of junction or integration between the “scholars–
experts– researchers” and the “managers/workers–practitioners–participants” (Blomquist et 
al, 2010, p.13; Kondrat, 1992, p.241; Lalonde et al, 2012, note 8, p.429; Van de Ven & 
Johnson, 2006, p.803;  Warry, 1992, p.160).  
 We suggest that there is a need to go further in-depth to fully grasp the importance of moving 
to consider one single class of actors in project situations. Hacking develops the idea of 
interactive classifications (see e.g. previous quote: Hacking, 2002, p. 10) and looping effects 
(Hacking, 1995) about “how classifications affect us and how we create new classes anew” 
(Hacking, 2002, p. 12). As a consequence, moving from the two classes dichotomy “scholars–
experts–researchers” and the “managers/workers–practitioners–participants” to one single 
class we name “praXitioners” (or “phronimos” in development) is all but neutral, with regards 
to a praxeological (praxeology defined as study or science of human actions and conduct, i.e. 
praxis) style of reasoning (Hacking, 2002, p. 3) and to go beyond the theory vs. practice / 
rigour vs. relevance gap. We maintain that this move away from the current dichotomy may 
contribute to create new perspectives through a new class and open up new ways of thinking 
and acting in project situations. The name praXitioner is both related to praxis, and to what 
Stacey names “reflexive practitioner” in contrast with the “reflective practitioner” (Schön, 
1983), “because reflexive practices involves noticing and thinking about participation with 
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others in the accomplishment of joint tasks […] Reflexive practice is more than reflective 
practice because it involves people in more than reflection together on what they are doing, 
and that more is inquiring into how they are thinking about what they are doing […] 
Reflexivity is thinking about how we are thinking” (Stacey, 2012, p. 112). We suggest 
therefore a shift from the “reflective practitioner” to the “reflexive praXitioner”, what 
Eikeland names being “native” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 45; 2012, p. 11).  
 
An emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning 
 
Practice and theory, in their relational, recursive and reflexive dimensions, should be 
embedded in practical contexts (Eikeland, 2008, p. 47). A dialogical and or dialectical mode 
of thought and action should be privileged for moving away any dichotomous thinking and 
choosing one side of the dichotomy (Eikeland, 2008, p. 48) and recognizing the whole 
dynamic of classification systems. Hacking (2002, p. 4) states that the essence of a style of 
reasoning is classification, “and also something need for thought itself”. Each style of 
reasoning introduces new objects, new classes of objects generating new classes of entities 
(e.g. “reflexive praXitioner”), and new onto-epistemological debates about their reality and 
the way of knowing about them. It creates its own appropriate “very criteria of truth” and is 
“self-authenticating” (Hacking, 2002, p. 4).  
We suggest therefore that an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, unequivocally 
rooted in Aristotle philosophy, can offer such this needed integrative approach, and we outline 
below some key tenets of this approach. Praxeology is defined as study or science of human 
actions and conduct, praxis and practices (Petruszewycz, 1965; Ostrowski, 1967) and, if its 
origin can tracked back to Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics (1926), the word praxeology is 
accredited to Louis Bourdeau in his "Théorie des sciences" (1882, last but one chapter; 
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Ostrowski, 1967, p. 21). A presentation of the origins of Praxeology, and more generally of 
works supported by a "praxeological intent" (Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 13), through an 
anthology of historical literature shows the richness of the concept, spanning from Economics 
to Mathematics & Probability, Games Theory & Economic Behavior and dialectical 
materialism (Bogdanov in Petruszewycz, 1965, p. 16 and in Le Moigne, 2007, p. 118) … and 
its comprehensiveness. We can mention further development in the area of Education & 
Learning (Pascal & Bertram, 2012), Social Science (Eikeland, 2012), and Project-as-Practice 
(Blomquist et al., 2010).  
At the heart of praxeology is the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis. For Aristotle (1926), 
the possession of intellectual virtues along with the possession of ethical virtues enables an 
individual to achieve eudaimonia. Eudaimonia actually requires activity, action, exhibiting 
virtue (excellence of character), and intellectual excellence (reason, rational activity). 
Phrónêsis, as knowledge form, is developed through a specific type of empeiria (practical 
acquired experience), a “way of knowing as activity” named praxis (Eikeland, 2008, p. 526). 
We can now see the full quality of praxis. It is not simply action based on reflection. It is 
action that embodies certain qualities. These include a commitment to eudaimonia and the 
search for truth, and respect for others. It is the action of people who are free, who are able to 
act for themselves. Moreover, praxis is always risky. It requires that a person “makes a wise 
and prudent practical judgement about how to act in this situation” (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 
190 quoted in). Praxis as such aims at the emancipation of individuals or communities from 
the alienating aspects of everyday practice subject to the hegemony of the rationalist forces 
constraining every day actions or activities (Frankenberg, 1988, p. 326—327). As Warry puts 
it:  
“Praxis research requires the development of non-alienating methodologies that are 
dialogic and participatory in nature. […]. Praxis, then, is not simply activity, but a 
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specific form of activity: activity based on knowledge informed by theory and performed 
according to ethical and moral principles for political ends. Habermas and Gadamer both 
point to “emancipatory praxis”, which appeals to communicative practice aimed at 
overcoming incommensurable beliefs. Emancipatory praxis is a specific type of moral and 
political activity aimed at the liberation of individuals or communities from alienating 
aspects of everyday practices.” (Warry, 1992, p. 157). 
Thus, according to an emancipatory praxeological perspective, we can put forward that the 
ultimate purpose of any “organization” is achieving eudaimonia (good life, human well-being, 
happiness) and social good through “Ethics” (Aristotle, 1926) and related “Politics” 
(Aristotle, 1944). Reasoning according to an emancipatory praxeology is thus about knowing 
and acting, on the basis of Ethics and Politics, from the viewpoint of the development of 
eudaimonia and social good. Furthermore, the emancipatory aspect is supported by the 
dialogical and dialectical mode of thought and action suggested above and the recognition of 
the dynamic and interactive relationship with and within any classification systems we may 
consider; for e.g. everyday practices and arbitrary vs. non arbitrary standards (Eikeland, 2008, 
p. 26), differentiating organizing episodes (Tsoukas, 2010) vs. recognizing that these episodes 
being intertwined and interacting with each other, universal vs. particular, general epistemic 
accounts vs. narratives and/or case studies, abstract vs. concrete, deductive vs. inductive vs. 
abductive logic, theoretical pluralism (Eikeland, 2008, pp. 42—43).  
With regards to knowledge, competence and ways of knowing as activities (i.e. practice), 
Eikeland (2008) explains that “knowledge and competence is increasingly developed from 
within practical contexts…making organisational learning in work places and all cooperative 
endeavours – i.e. collective efforts, experiential learning and improvement – increasingly 
important in general” (pp. 21—22). This relation between knowing and practicing is also 
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acknowledged by Weisinger & Salipante (2000): "The knowing is bound with the practicing 
of seemingly mundane actions … knowing as situated learning and practicing" (p. 387).  
Thus, praxis and phrónêsis, in their mediating role serve as focal point through which 
dichotomies are integrated, and have been recognized as "emancipatory" (Habermas, 1971, p. 
314; Gadamer, 1975), and offering "a way of reflecting on disjuncture between the formal 
rationality and the substantive rationality" (Kondrat, 1992, p. 253). Project management 
authors such as Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9),  Cicmil & Hodgson (quoting Balck, 1994, p. 2 in 
Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 13), and Lalonde et al. (2012, p. 428) have acknowledged a 
similar view. As Eikeland (2008, p. 87) puts it, supporting our view about the above-defined 
“praXitioner”: “Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, the student and the studied, 
the knower and the known, coincide.”  
 
Closing the phronetic gap 
 
An important aspect connected to the mediating role of praxis and Phrónêsis and to what 
Taylor (1993, p. 57) calls closing “the pronetic gap”, is that the Aristotelian tradition enables 
us to specify how to “reconnect Means and Ends, Facts and Values” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 
1997, p. 668), and to move beyond “a dualistic way of thinking” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 
1997, p. 668) about doing (practice) and reasoning (theory), factual statements and evaluative 
judgments  
We need to start from Aristotle’s teleological view of the world. For him, human agents and 
natural things are defined for the sake of some functions or purposes (ends). From a factual 
statement such as “He/She (e.g. practitioner Project Manager (PM)) meets recurrently and 
successfully the project objectives” we can infer the evaluative judgment “s(he) is a good 
PM”. Teleologically, classifying someone as a PM is to think about the purposes, the ends, 
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s(he) pursues with regards to the functions or roles s(he) fulfils or the way s(he) is expected to 
behave, “not conceiving [him/her] as ahistorical selves or abstract individuals” (Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 670). Thus, calling a PM “good” is to make a factual statement about 
what an acknowledged “good” PM does, and not referring to a list of attributes he/she should 
meet. A concept such as “good” is not an abstract entity or category in a classification system, 
but is embedded in the activity, particular context and situation (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 113). 
Calling a particular action “good” means what a “good” PM would (is expected) do in the 
situation and is therefore making a factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas & 
Cummings, 1997, p. 670) reconciling facts and values. A direct implication is that the 
development of knowledge and competence should be made through practical acquired 
experience (empeiría) and perfecting actualization (energeia) and not just through perception 
(aísthêsis), abstract, distant and external observation. We can see here the alignment with the 
way of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” as “Standards” (Eikeland, 2008, 
p.26). 
 
Collective praxis, standards, ethics and politics 
 
Developing “do”, i.e. practice and knowledge and competence (i.e. theory), is done by 
entering the tradition of a community of practitioners (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987; Brown 
& Duguid, 1991) sharing common goals, i.e. ends, will, wish, or want and opinion (Eikeland, 
2008, p. 87, 121) and way of achieving them (means, but with the underlying idea of doing 
(praxis) and doing well (eupraxia). Being part of the community (i.e. Polis) doesn’t involve 
blind acceptance of standards, conventions, norms (nomos – laws) but at the same time the 
acceptance of historically developed laws and collective dialogues, debates, deliberations 
about them leading to possibly changing them (Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, 
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p. 670; also see Castoriadis, 1991, p.104 for ancient Greek conception of politics))  Tsoukas 
& Cummings (1997, p. 671) rightly enhances: “…in the social domain in general, and in 
organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together”.  
For Aristotle,  
“praxis is not only individual, however. Collective praxis is possible when we follow 
common standards, and adjust to each other communicatively, i.e. through establishing 
mutual and common understandings of how things should be done in “concord” 
(homónoia in EN1167a22-b16, EE1241a16—34), as e.g. in grammatical regulations of 
language use, or when musicians and dancers play according to a common score, or 
improvise, tuning in on each other knowing the basic principles of the music and the 
dance”” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87).  
Developing “good practice” is done by entering the tradition of a community of practitioners 
(MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987) sharing common goals, i.e. “ends”, will, wish, or want and 
opinion (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87, 121) and way of achieving them, i.e. “means”, but with the 
underlying idea of doing (praxis) and doing well (eupraxia). The distinction between ends 
and means in Aristotle is not an easy topic, and is linked to the four Aristotelian causes 
(material, formal, efficient (the near only one considered by moderns and post-moderns), and 
final (for an in-depth discussion see e.g. Eikeland, 2008, p.194—196).  
But how are these common “good practice” or standards conceived, developed and used after 
an Aristotelian perspective? The way of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” has 
to be made clear. According to Eikeland (2008, pp. 25), three kind of traditions can be 
considered: 1) Covering laws (deductive nomological or hypothetico-deductive model), 2) 
Statistical generalizations and, 3) Standards. Standards can be understood as ideals for 
practitioners, defining what it means to perform certain kind of an activity competently or 
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with certain quality (p.26). These standards are transient and change when someone performs 
them better.  
Being part of the community (i.e. polis) doesn’t involve blind acceptance of standards, 
conventions, norms (nomos, i.e. laws) but at the same time the acceptance of historically 
developed laws and collective dialogues, debates, deliberations about them leading to possibly 
changing them (Castoriadis, 1991; Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670).  
Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 671) rightly enhances: “…in the social domain in general, 
and in organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together”. 
Thus, through praxis and phronesis, “Ethics is politics inasmuch as the achievement of human 
happiness” (Strang, 1998, p. 1).   
 
Concluding comments: Reconnecting Theory – Practice: the role of a emancipatory 
praxeological style of reasoning 
 
Summarizing the work done by the research network “Rethinking Project Management”, 
Winter, Smith, Morris and Cicmil (2006) suggest “five [three main] directions in which the 
current conceptual foundations of project management need to develop in relation to the 
developing practice.” (p. 642): 
1. Theory ABOUT Practice (knowledge 'about' practice): Lifecycle model of projects and 
project management vs. theories of the complexity of projects and project management. 
Theory that helps us to understand practice, albeit from a particular perspective, but which 
does not necessarily have immediate practical application;  
2. Theory FOR Practice (knowledge 'for' practice): this is a reference to concepts and 
approaches that do have practical application 
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3. Theory IN Practice (knowledge 'in' practice): practitioners as trained technicians vs. 
practitioners as reflective practitioners. This is essentially a reference to how practitioners 
learn their craft, and how they actually practice their craft using relevant theory from the 
published literature on project management.  (Winter et al. 2006, p. 641—642). 
In this presentation theory is seen mainly as relating to epistêmê1 & 2 (theôría and theôrêsis) 
and tékhnê, and practice as relating to poíêsis. Furthermore, the explicit/implicit dimension is 
here privileged.   
While recognizing the relevance of these directions strongly rooted in a classical perspective 
(i.e.  “knowledge and inquiry ‘for’ and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice’” (Kondrat, 1992, p. 
238)), we argue that this work should go further and does not fully build on its argument.  
With regards to the above discussion about the three knowledge perspectives (and to the tacit, 
implicit, and explicit dimensions), we can conclude to the need for two more directions: 
Theory FROM Practice (including knowledge 'from' and knowing 'in' practice, and therefore a 
tacit dimension), and Theory AS Practice (knowing 'as' practicing) reconnecting the tacit, 
implicit and explicit dimensions. Extending the long-standing debate that “research and 
practice produce distinct form of knowledge” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 806) and in 
order to enable a better understanding the relationship between epistêmê1 & 2 (theôría and 
theôrêsis), tékhnê, and phronesis, we would suggest considering the following complementary 
knowledge perspectives:  
Theory FROM Practice: 
4. Knowledge 'from' practice, Van de Ven, 2006, p. 805) – tékhnê ‘from’ poíêsis and & 
dialetics, dialogue ‘from’ praxis1: with Kondrat, (1992), reversing the classical perspective 
(knowledge ‘for practice’) and beyond the discussion about “knowledge and inquiry ‘for’ and 
‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice”, recognizing that “What has been missing from our collective 
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conversation concerning practice knowledge is an empirical study of practice knowledge 
itself”. (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238).  
5. Knowing 'in' practice – tékhnê, dialectics and dialogue, deduction and deliberation 'in' 
poíêsis, praxis1, and theôría / epistêmê1: “our knowing is ‘in’ our action”. (Schön, 1983, p. 
49). Schön argues that the skilful practice shown by professionals do not consist of applying 
some a priori knowledge to a specific decision or action, but rather of a kind of knowing that 
is inherent in their action. Maturana and Varela (1998, p. 27—29) similarly define knowing as 
“effective action”, and write that “all doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing.” In Practice 
theory words, Giddens (1984, p. 4) explicates knowledgeability as “inherent within the ability 
to ‘go on’ within the routines of social life”. As Feldman & Orlikowski (2011) put it:  
“These insights have led to an understanding of knowing in practice as the 
knowledgeability that is continually enacted through ongoing action. Such an 
understanding rejects the traditional dualism set up between knowledge that exists “out 
there” (encoded in external objects, routines, or systems) and knowledge that exists “in 
here” (embedded in human brains, bodies, or communities).” (Feldman & Orlikowski, 
2011, p. 1243) 
6. Theory AS Practice: Knowing-'as'-Practicing – poíêsis / Tékhnê; praxis1  / dialetics, 
dialogue; theôría = epistêmê1 / dialogue, deduction, deliberation; khrêsis, poíêsis / Tékhnê; 
praxis2 / Phrónêsis (deliberation); theôrêsis = epistêmê2 / Deduction, demonstration, didactics. 
The logic of ‘Knowing-in-Practice’ is fully realised through ‘Knowing-as Practicing’ 
following recursive logic between “theorizing practice and practicing theory” and the fact 
that “theorizing practice is itself a practice” (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1250). We 
follow here Van de Ven & Johnson (2006) and their plea in favour of engaged scholarship 
and while moving beyond with our view regards to a single class of 'praXitioner".  
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With regards to project organizing, some authors have taken these two directions ('from' and 
'as'), explicitly or not, proposing various perspectives, e.g. ‘Making Project Critical’ 
(Hodgson, 2002; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Cicmil, Hodgson, 
Lindgren & Packendorff; 2009), ‘Phronetic Research’ (Flyvbjerg, 2004), ‘future-perfect’ 
(Pitsis, Clegg, Marosszeky, & Rura-Polley, 2003), ‘multi-rationalities and cultures’ (van 
Marrewijk et al., 2008), ‘Project-as-Practice’ (Blomquist et al., 2010), ‘PM Practice / Rethoric 
& Pragmatist’ (Lalonde et al, 2012).  
A common characteristic to these perspectives is, to a certain extent depending on the authors, 
the acknowledgement of the concurrent and integrative advancement of knowledge (epistêmê, 
tékhnê and phrónêsis) in relation to empirical ground (theôría, theôrêsis, poíêsis and praxis).  
Moving a step further, a logical consequence of this dual objective, for a science that matters, 
is to recognise that the reflexive production and transfer of knowledge (epistêmê, tékhnê and 
phrónêsis) useful for the advancement of (theôría, theôrêsis, poíêsis and praxis involve an 
emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning. We can posit that reconnecting theory and 
practice, i.e. transcending the five directions above-discussed: Theory ABOUT, FOR, IN and 
FROM Practice, and the gaps and dichotomous thinking they each carry, requests a balanced 
style of reasoning. We argue that an emancipatory praxeological style of reasoning, rooted in 
Aristotelian practical and ethical philosophy, is appropriate to the pluralistic project 
organizing contexts and situations. Indeed,  
"practical wisdom (phronesis) which deals with both universals and particulars. More 
precisely, phronesis is knowing what is good for human beings in general as well as 
having the ability to apply such knowledge to particular situations, or, as Aristotle 
remarks, it is the ’reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods’ 
(Aristotle, 1980, 1140b 6)." (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 665). 
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